I am currently reading the fascinating study 'Official Ulama and the Politics of Re-Islamisation: The Majelis Permesyuwaratan Ulama, Shariatisation and Contested Religious Authority in Post-New Order Aceh' by my dear friend and colleague Moch Nur Ichwan of Sunan Kalijaga Islamic University, Jogjakarta. It has proven to be a worthwhile effort that has taught me many interesting things about the state of religious politics in Indonesia and the troubled province of Aceh in particular.

Ichwan's thesis is that what we have witnessed in Aceh since the end of the Suharto era is a complex and at times clumsy attempt to domesticate the forces of Acehnese resistance by playing the religious card. This is, unfortunately, a tactic that has been used and abused too many times by floundering political elites in Muslim countries worldwide, and Indonesia is no exception to the rule.

To set things in context, we need to remember that Aceh has historically been one of the most Islamic parts of Indonesia as it was the point of entry when Islam first arrived to the Indonesian archipelago from the 13th century onwards. Aceh has historically seen and presented itself as the 'verandah of Mecca' and the centre for Muslim piety as well as scholarship, and rightfully boasts of having produced some of the more important Muslim thinkers of Southeast Asia for centuries.

However as Ichwan also correctly notes, the Acehnese are equally proud of their culture, language and customs as they are of their Muslim identity, and they played a vital role in the resistance to Dutch colonial rule from the 19th to 20th centuries. Since Indonesia gained its independence many Acehnese leaders had hoped that the Indonesian republic would recognise their efforts in the liberation struggle and would offer the province the status of special province instead. This never happened, and the failure to recognise Aceh's historical role as a centre for culture as well as political resistance was one of the factors that fueled the communitarian sentiments of the Acehnese from the 1940s to the present.

During the eras of Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto (1965-1998), Aceh was the seen as one of the 'problematic' regions of Indonesia and sadly became the battleground for an insurgency war when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was created in the mid-1970s led by Hasan Tiro. The Acehnese leaders have constantly complained about their loss of local political control and that vital resources such as oil and gas were being tapped from Aceh but with little development in their own region. This merely fueled even more resentment against the federal government in Jakarta, which in turn escalated the conflict in Aceh further, leading to the region being declared a military zone (DOM) and the loss of thousands of lives.

Fast-forward to the late Suharto era and we see how successive administrations in Jakarta have tried to deal with the Aceh issue: The late Suharto era witnessed the state's support of conservative Ulama organisations that were courted by the Suharto regime and co-opted into the state institutional framework. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, successive administrations in Jakarta have tried to pacify the demands of the Acehnese by making token concessions in terms of offering them the opportunity to implement Islamic law: Though as Ichwan notes, Acehnese groups like GAM have never asked for the implementation of religious laws and punishments per se, but instead more political autonomy and the right to manage their own natural resources.

This has led us to the murky situation we see in Aceh at present, where a state-sponsored top-down form of Islamisation has been put into place by the powers in Jakarta in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese. But the parallel religious bureaucracy that has been created by the state has shown that it too has a mind of its own and has issued laws that go against the spirit of the Indonesian constitution: the latest instance being the case of the punishment to stone adulterers to death, which elicited an outcry from human rights NGOs in Indonesia and abroad. Having toyed around with Islam, the political elite seem to realise now that political religion is a variable that cannot be controlled.

Another point to note is that while these token moves in the direction of Islamisation are mainly cosmetic, they do not address the real political and economic demands of the Acehnese people and groups like GAM, which is to be given the right to govern themselves and profit from their own resources. GAM's reaction has been negative and consistent, replying to the central government in Jakarta with the proposition: "We asked for autonomy and economic self-governance, and you gave us religious law and Hudud punishments instead."

The sad story of state-manipulated Islamisation in Aceh is a sound lesson for all. It should remind political elites that real political and economic demands that are articulated by marginalised communities ought to be taken seriously, rather than met with token cosmetic concessions that do not address the causes of revolt and dissatisfaction. Worse of all, by toying about with Islam thus, Jakarta may have created a parallel Islamic bureaucracy in Aceh that has no credibility (as it is seen as a tool of the central government) and may one day get out of control. As the religious authorities in Aceh contemplate more and more laws such as stoning to death and the like, it would appear that the nightmare scenario has become more real than ever; and Aceh is nowhere nearer getting the recognition and respect it demands and deserves. (By FARISH A. NOOR/MySinchew)

(FARISH A. NOOR is Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore)